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Abstract 
Limited fiscal space limits Djibouti’s ability to meet the Millennium Development Goals and 
improve the living conditions of its population. Djibouti’s fiscal structure is unique in that 
almost 70 percent of government revenue is denominated in foreign currency (import taxes, 
foreign aid grants and military revenue) while over 50 percent of government expenditure is 
denominated in local currency (wages, salaries and social transfers). Djibouti’s economic 
structure is also unusual in that merchandise exports of local origin are insignificant, and the 
country relies heavily on imported goods (food, medicines, consumer and capital goods). A 
currency devaluation, by reducing real wages, could potentially generate additional fiscal 
space that would help meet Djibouti’s fundamental development goals. Using macro and 
household level data, this paper quantifies the impact of a devaluation of the nominal 
exchange rate on fiscal savings, real public sector wages, real income and poverty, under 
various hypothetical scenarios of exchange-rate pass-through and magnitude of devaluation. 
We find that a currency devaluation could indeed generate fiscal savings in the short-term, 
but it would have an adverse effect on poverty and income distribution.  A 30 percent 
nominal exchange rate devaluation could generate fiscal savings amounting between 3 and 7 
percent of GDP. At the same time, a 30 percent nominal devaluation could cause nearly a 
fifth of the poorest households to fall below the extreme poverty line and pull the same 
fraction of upper middle-income households below the national poverty line. We also find 
that currency devaluation could generate net fiscal savings even after accounting for the 
additional social transfers needed to compensate the poor for their real income loss. 
However, the absence of formal social safety nets limits the government’s readiness to 
provide well-targeted and timely social transfers to the poor.  
 
This paper aims at providing some empirical evidence of the potential fiscal and social 
impact of currency devaluation in Djibouti drawing on household survey data.  In this 
regard, the paper does not aim to provide economic policy recommendations on exchange 
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1. Introduction  
 
The government of Djibouti is committed to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
and to rapidly improve the living conditions of its population.  But high factor costs and limited 
fiscal space stand in the way of meeting these fundamental development goals.  Despite 
considerable progress over recent years, Djibouti’s public sector wage bill is one of the largest 
among developing countries. It represented nearly 14 percent of GDP in 2004, 60 percent of total 
fiscal revenues, almost 50 percent of total current expenditures, and more than 40 percent of total 
government expenditures leaving little fiscal space for social spending.
2 The annual average pay 
of a civil servant is about 10 times the country’s GNI per capita. High public sector wages serve 
as a benchmark for private sector wages putting upward pressure on unit labor costs. The high 
public sector wages also contribute to the cost of publicly owned energy, water and telephone 
utilities. These high production costs are a barrier to growth and indirectly to poverty reduction, 
by crowding out other government spending on productive investment and basic social services. 
 
The Djibouti authorities have made policy choices to address the high factor cost problem and 
reduce the fiscal burden of the wage bill - but their effectiveness has proved limited. The 
Djibouti’s policy intentions have been to implement fiscal and structural reforms to reduce the 
high production costs while maintaining a fixed exchange rate regime. The government is 
committed to implement structural reforms, including: revising the investment, labor and 
commerce codes and privatizing management of publicly-owned utilities (electricity, water and 
telecommunications). On the fiscal front, the Djibouti authorities are also committed to contain 
the public sector wage bill through retiring eligible civil servants, demobilizing military personnel 
hired during the civil war in the mid 1990’s and instituting a freeze on new hiring in non-priority 
sectors. However, the implementation of these reforms has proceeded at a slow pace and the 
public sector wage bill and utility tariffs remain high.   
 
A currency devaluation is an alternative policy option to reduce factor costs and create fiscal 
space to reallocate expenditure towards the attainment of MDGs and poverty reduction. 
Currency devaluation is typically considered in response to balance-of-payments difficulties and 
as a policy option to improve export competitiveness and growth prospects. In Djibouti, given the 
structural features of its economy, a nominal exchange rate devaluation is likely to be 
contractionary in the short-run (see footnote and Annex 1)
3. The interest of considering a 
currency devaluation lies on its impact on the fiscal accounts. Djibouti’s fiscal structure is such 
that its main sources of revenue (namely foreign grants and military aid) are denominated in 
                                                 
2 The high level and the structure of civil pay was inherited from the French colonial administration and has changed 
little since independence. By virtue of Djibouti’s currency board system (under which the nominal exchange rate has 
not changed since 1971), inflation is only about 2 percent, which does little to adjust real wages down as in other 
developing countries. 
3 Unlike many developing countries, Djibouti has a limited productive capacity of tradable goods and services, a 
marginal agricultural sector and a large non-tradable urban sector. As a result, the aggregate supply response of the 
tradable sector to reduced real wages will be limited, at least in the short-term. At the same time, a currency 
devaluation is likely to have a negative impact on aggregate demand. Private consumption is likely to fall due to the 
real income loss that households will experience as a result of the devaluation. Most of the consumption basket consists 
of tradable goods and most of the labor income is generated in the non-tradable service sector.  A currency devaluation 
may also have a negative impact in the private investment demand in the non-tradable sector given the high 
dependency of the economy on imported intermediate and capital goods.   The overall investment demand is likely to 
fall as the limited expected supply response of the tradable sector would remain insufficient to offset the negative 
impact on  the private investment demand in the non-tradable sector. In addition, in Djibouti half of the deposits are in 
foreign currency. If the public attempts to convert domestic currency denominated deposits and liquidate its foreign 
exchange debts, this could lead to higher interest rates, which would tend to increase contractionary pressures on 
investment.    4
foreign currency while most of the expenditures (with the wage bill absorbing half of the budget) 
are largely denominated in domestic currency. Thus, a nominal exchange rate devaluation could 
generate short-term fiscal savings that could be reallocated for poverty reduction purposes.  
 
However, a currency devaluation could have a considerable negative impact on poverty.  In 
Djibouti, unlike many developing countries, tradable goods make up a significant share of poor 
household’s consumption baskets (over 60 percent). Tradable goods and services include food 
staples, qhat, medicines, clothing, housing, water, electricity gas and other fuels, furnishing, 
domestic equipment, health, transportation, hotels, cafes and restaurants. Food staples and qhat 
alone account for over 80 percent of the share of tradables in total household expenditure. In rural 
areas, poor households’ consumption baskets are even more biased towards tradable goods, 
reflecting the larger share of food staples in consumption. Furthermore, the degree of import 
substitution is limited owing to the country’s weak domestic productive capacity and the poor 
natural conditions for the development of agriculture. On the other hand, poor household’s labor 
income is mostly derived from non tradable services. The proportion of labor earnings from the 
tradable sector is low and rises slightly as household consumption increases. The lack of formal 
safety nets and the strong reliance of poor households on informal transfers from family members 
employed in the public sector calls for a careful assessment of the potential social costs associated 
with a nominal exchange rate devaluation.  
 
This paper seeks to answer three main questions : 
 
(i)  What would be the short-term fiscal gain of a nominal exchange rate devaluation? 
 
(ii)  What would be the social cost associated with a devaluation of the Djibouti franc?  
 
(iii)   What would be the net fiscal gain of a nominal exchange rate devaluation (after accounting 
for the social transfers needed to compensate the poor for their real income loss)?  
  
Holding other things constant, the answers to these questions will be dependent on the magnitude 
of the devaluation, the degree of exchange-rate pass-through to domestic prices and the degree of 
public sector wage indexation. To answer these questions the paper proceeds in sequential steps. 
First, it estimates the exchange rate pass-through to domestic prices. Second, it moves on to 
quantify the potential short-term fiscal impact of a nominal exchange rate devaluation drawing on 
a static, partial equilibrium model. Third, it proceeds to quantify the potential short-term social 
impact (in terms of average real income loss per household; impact on incidence and depth of 
poverty and on overall income distribution) using available household survey data
4. Fourth, it 
estimates the total amount of social transfers that would be needed to compensate the poor 
(including poor households that become poorer after the devaluation; and those who are not poor 
but fall below the poverty line after the devaluation). 
 
The paper’s main findings are as follows:  
 
                                                 
4 The two most recent household surveys in Djibouti were conducted in 1996 and 2002. This paper draws on the 1996 
household survey (EDAM-I) because its design was better suited for the analysis. While the composition of household 
expenditure and sectoral labor participation patterns are similar in both surveys, the 2002 survey point to a deterioration 
in overall poverty and unemployment levels. Therefore, the preliminary estimates reported in the paper may 
underestimate the social impact of a currency devaluation in Djibouti.   5
•  A  currency devaluation could generate fiscal savings in the short-term. A 30 percent 
nominal exchange rate devaluation could generate short-term fiscal savings amounting between 
3 and 7 percent of GDP ( depending on the degree of exchange rate pass-through). 
 
•  However, a devaluation of the Djibouti franc will have a significant negative short-term 
impact on poverty. Assuming a nominal exchange rate devaluation of 30 percent and exchange 
pass-through of 60 percent, the number of households below the national poverty line could rise 
by 5 to 6 percentage points. Over 17 percent of households in the lowest consumption quartile 
could fall below the subsistence or extreme poverty line. About 20 percent of middle-income 
households (in the third quartile of the income distribution) could fall below the national poverty 
line. 
 
•  A currency devaluation could still generate fiscal savings even after accounting for the 
social transfers that would be needed to compensate the poor for their real income loss. A 
nominal exchange rate devaluation of 30 percent could still generate fiscal savings between 1 
and 3 percent of GDP (depending on the degree of exchange rate pass-through) even after 
accounting for the social transfers that would be needed to compensate the poor for their real 
income loss.  
 
•  Yet, the lack of formal safety nets limits the government’s readiness to provide well-
targeted and timely social transfers to compensate the poor for their real income loss caused by 
a currency devaluation. Irrespective of the policy option chosen to address the high factor cost 
problem and the high public sector wage bill, setting up an effective system of social safety nets 
should be a short-term priority. Adequate safety nets will help the government address the needs 
of the poor in good economic times and be adaptable to combat the adverse effect of eventual 
shocks.      
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides the country background, 
sketching the main features of Djibouti’s economy and describes recent exchange rate and fiscal 
developments. Section 3 estimates the exchange pass-through drawing on available household 
survey data. Section 4 develops an empirical model of the real exchange rate and the fiscal sector 
to quantify the real fiscal savings of nominal exchange rate devaluation. Section 5 estimates the 
impact on poverty and income distribution of the devaluation drawing on available household 
survey data. Section 6 estimates the amount of social transfers that would be needed to 
compensate the poor for their real income loss and computes the fiscal savings generated by a 
currency devaluation after accounting for social transfers. Section 7 concludes with some policy 
implications. 
 
2. Country Background 
 
2.1. Economic Structure 
 
Djibouti has a limited domestic productive capacity and the tertiary sector dominates the 
economy.  Djibouti is poorly endowed with natural resources (limited arable land, rainfall, and 
underground water). Domestic production remains limited, owing to the harsh climate, high 
production costs, and the paucity of skilled workers. The country’s small internal market and high 
factor costs limit its manufacturing potential. Agriculture and manufacturing accounted together 
for only 6 percent of GDP in 2004. The tertiary sector dominates the economy, contributing about 
80 percent to gross domestic product (GDP) in 2004. With the exception of port-related services, 
military logistics services and tourism, most services are classified as non-tradables. These   6
 
Figure 1.  Djibouti: Real Exchange Rate Index, Real Fiscal Revenue Index 
















services include public administration, electricity, water, financial services to the expatriate 
community, commerce, communications and transport services.  
 
Merchandise exports of local origin are insignificant, and the country relies almost entirely on 
imported food and consumer goods. Merchandise exports produced in Djibouti are limited, 
consisting mainly of live animals and skins. About 80 percent of good exports are actually re-
exports that go through Djibouti’s port. Djibouti’s main sources of foreign exchange earnings are 
official grants, military aid, receipts from services to the expatriate community, and port revenues 
from re-exporting goods to foreign military personnel and neighboring countries. Good imports 
represented over 55 percent of GDP in 2004.  
 
2.2. Fiscal Structure and the Real Exchange Rate 
 
Djibouti fiscal structure suggests potential fiscal savings from a currency devaluation.   
Revenues are largely denominated in foreign currency while expenditures are largely 
denominated in domestic currency. Djibouti’s government revenue relies heavily on import taxes 
(around 30.3 percent of total revenue in 2004), foreign aid grants (19.2 percent of revenue) and 
military revenue (17.8 percent of revenues), all of which are denominated in foreign currency. On 
the other hand, the wage bill and transfers make up over 50 percent of total expenditure, and these 
expenditures are denominated in domestic currency terms.  
 
Real fiscal revenues move in tandem with the real exchange rate. During the last two decades 
the Djibouti real effective exchange rate has experienced a strong appreciation that has been 
reversed in the last few years. Figure 1 shows the movement of the real (CPI based) effective 
exchange rate index, real fiscal revenue index and real government expenditure index between 
1980 and 2004. All values are shown with 1996 as the base year and deflated with the GDP 
deflator except for the REER. For comparative purposes, the REER is redefined such that a 
falling level should be taken as an appreciation while a rising trend indicates depreciation. The 
REER has appreciated by 61 percent between 1980 and 2001, though a turning point appears to 
have taken place in 2002 where the REER started to depreciate.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on WEO 2004. 
2.3. Labor Market 
 
The non-tradable sector is labor 
intensive.  Household survey data 
indicates that 80 percent of the 
employed labor force is 
concentrated in public 
administration, tourism and 
commerce and other general 
services that serve domestic 
demand.  
 
High nominal wages in the public sector drive up labor costs in the economy. The average 
public sector wage in Djibouti is 9 to 10 times the country’s income per capita and 5 to 10 times 
the average public sector wage in Ethiopia and Yemen. Because the public sector wages are used 
as a benchmark for private sector wages, they drive up labor costs, deterring firm expansion and 
job creation.  
 
The official unemployment rate is high, at about 56 percent in 2002. Youth employment is also 

















































20000 80000 300000 1000000
Adult-equivalent per-capita household expenditure, 1996...
Share of Expenditure on Tradable Items
density: Adult-equivalent per-capita household expenditure, 1996

















































20000 80000 300000 1000000
Adult-equivalent per-capita household expenditure, 2002...
Share of Expenditure on Tradable Items
density: Adult-equivalent per-capita household expenditure, 2002
Source: Authors' calculation based on EDAMS 2002
 
unemployed. High unemployment rate in conjunction with low labor force participation rate 
imply that only a small fraction of Djibouti nationals are engaged in formal wage employment. 
Less than 20 percent in 1996 and 40 percent in 2002 of the population aged 15 and above were 





Poverty is high and rising. Despite its relatively high per capita income (with a GNI per capita of 
US$1,030 in purchasing power parity terms), Djibouti has some of the highest rates of poverty in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (over 42 percent of its population lives below US$2 a day). Increased poverty 
is the legacy from almost two decades of slow growth, lackluster private investment, and a fast-
growing unskilled labor force. Over the past two decades, real GDP growth averaged about 1 
percent per year. With an average annual population growth rate of 2.5 percent, this weak 
economic performance led to a continued decline in real income per capita. The stark decline in 
per capita income explains the deterioration in poverty levels. Figures 2 and 3 provide a 
description of where the majority of households are located in terms of their per-capita 
expenditure for 1996 and 2002 respectively. Over the 6 year period, the rapid deterioration in 
economic well-being can be seen in the left-ward shift of the mass of the population, falling 
below the extreme poverty line by 2002.  
 
Poverty is more widespread in the rural and urban areas outside the city of Djibouti and 
surrounding districts.  The incidence of rural poverty is over seven times greater to the incidence 
of urban poverty.  Furthermore, the condition of the rural poor has further deteriorated over time. 
In 2002, 83 percent of rural Djiboutians were living in extreme poverty, unable to meet even 
basic nutritional needs as compared to 45.1 percent in 1996.  
                    
Figure 2: Poverty Incidence & Share of Tradables       Figure 3: Incidence of Poverty & Share of Tradables 















The consumption of the poor is heavily concentrated on food. As household income rises, the 
share of food in the total budget declines. The poorest households in the first income quartile
6 
spend 57.1 percent of their total expenditure on food in contrast to 30.4 percent incurred by the 
richest households as seen in the first column of Table 1. Interestingly, the qhat share in total 
                                                 
5 Unemployment figures should be read with caution, because they may also include underemployment. Partly owing to 
weak formal insurance mechanisms, very few individuals can afford to be jobless in Djibouti. As a result, many 
workers undertake any type of work in the informal sector. See Chapter 3 of the 2005 Djibouti Country Economic 
Memorandum for further details on the labor market. 
6 Income quartiles are derived using per-capita adult equivalent household annual expenditure which is a common 








Poverty Line   8
expenditure rises from 3.5 percent in the lower quartile to 14.7 percent to the richest quartile 
which alludes to better-off households purchasing more expensive qhat (probably of higher 
quality).  
 
In Djibouti, unlike many other developing countries, the poor consume a disproportionately 
large share of tradable goods. Table 1 shows that tradable goods
7 (of which food makes up the 
largest share) accounts for more than 76 percent of the overall expenditure of households in the 
first income quartile. This declines to 57 percent for the richest group in the forth quartile. The 
share of tradable is even large for rural households again due to the contribution of food 
consumption. Figure 2 and 3  illustrates the negative relationship between the share of tradable in 
overall household expenditure and adult-equivalent consumption for both 1996 and 2002, 
respectively. 
 
   Table 1 Djibouti: Household Expenditure Share of Tradable Goods, 1996 
food qhat tradables food qhat tradables
All 42.7 9.5 66.2 58.0 8.3 79.5
poorest 57.1 3.5 76.2 65.7 3.7 71.5
2nd quartile 45.2 7.5 67.6 49.5 10.5 61.5
3rd quartile 38.1 12.2 63.8 46.0 20.1 52.1
richest 30.4 14.7 57.3 33.9 24.1 42.9
Note: Budget shares are expressed as a percentage of total household expenditure.
Source: Authors' calculation based on EDAM 1996.
Income Categories All Djibouti Rural Area
 
 
While most Djiboutians earn labor income from the non-tradable sector, better-off households 
earn a higher share of their labor income from the public sector in contrast to poorer 
households. Figure 4 shows the modest contribution of labor earnings from the tradable sector
8 
which rises slightly with per-capita adult equivalent household consumption. Better-off 
households earn a higher share of their wage incomes from the public sector in contrast to poorer 
households as indicated in Figure 5
9.   
                                                 
7 Tradable goods based on the 1996 survey data consist of tobacco, qhat, school supplies, clothing and medical drugs 
while non-tradable  goods and services are water and electric expenses, rent, health services and transportation 
8 Tradable sectors include manufacturing, retail and port services. The retail trade involves local distribution (a non-
tradable component), but given the small size of the country this component is not significant. 
9 In the first quartile, the poorest household share of public sector wages in overall labor income is 18.3 percent, rising  
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Adult-equivalent per-capita household expenditure, 1996...
Share of Public Sector Labor Income
density: Adult-equivalent per-capita household expenditure, 1996
Source: Authors' calculation based on EDAMS 1996
 
             Figure 4 : Share of  Labor Income from Tradable Sector, 1996     Figure 5 : Share of  Labor Income from the Public Sector, 1996   
 
Djibouti does not have formal safety nets to protect the poor from real income losses. The poor 
are supported informally by remittances from relatives living abroad or from better-off 
relatives living in Djibouti. Table 2 shows net remittances as a share of total household 
expenditure. While the poorest households are net recipients, receiving equivalent of 7 percent of 
their total consumption, the richest households tend to be net distributors of remittances as 
indicated by the negative sign. High wages and other fringe benefits currently form the bulk of 
current expenditures, limiting the fiscal space to redistribute income to the poor. Non-wage 
allowances (pensions, health and family allowances, and other stipends) benefit primarily the 
upper-middle class. Access to the social security benefits depends on formal sector employment 
(mostly public sector employment), which is reserved largely for the middle class. The bottom 
decile, which includes the indigent population, receives only 4 percent of total government cash 
transfers—that is, 60 percent less than an average person. This contrasts with the eighth decile, 
which receives twice the average, and the tenth decile, which receives about the average amount 
of transfers. In Djibouti, virtually no formal safety nets (government-financed cash or in-kind 
programs targeted to the poor) protect the poor other than those financed by international 
agencies directed to refugees and victims of natural disasters.  
 
 
Table 2 Djibouti: Net Remittances Share in Overall Expenditure, 1996 
Income Categories All Djibouti Rural
All 3.9 8.9
poorest 7.7 9.0
2nd quartile 5.4 11.7
3rd quartile 2.8 7.1
richest -0.4 1.6
Note: Shares are expressed as a percentage of total household expenditure.
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3. Estimating the Pass-Through Effect of a Nominal Exchange Rate 
Devaluation 
 
This section aims at estimating the exchange rate pass-through to domestic prices that would be 
necessary for the subsequent analysis of the social and fiscal impact of a nominal exchange rate 
devaluation.  
 
Drawing on available time series data, the following equation is estimated: 
10   
 
(1)   it it i t i t i i i it p L C neer L B p L A a p ε + Δ + Δ + Δ + = Δ −
*
1 , 0 ) ( ) ( ) ( ,  
 
where  it p  is the log price index of good i,  t neer  is the log effective nominal exchange rate and 
*
it p  is log effective foreign producer price index for good iand ε  is the white noise disturbance 
term. The terms  ) (L Ai ,  ) (L Bi  and  ) (L Ci  denote lag polynomials. The effective foreign 
producer price is computed as arithmetic averages using trade weights
11: 
 













it P  is the effective foreign producer price index,  n w  is the average trade weight for 
Djibouti’s main trading partners between 1995 and 1999, and 
*
int P  is the producer price index of 
foreign country n  at time t.  
 
The short-run exchange rate pass through elasticity is defined as the contemporaneous coefficient 
of  ) (L Bi   while the long-run elasticity is  )) ( 1 /( ) ( L A L B i i − . Thus a 1 percent nominal effective 
devaluation will result in an increase in relative prices of the good in question 
by )) ( 1 /( ) ( L A L B i i − . 
 
Due to data limitations, pass-through equations could not be estimated for all the tradable goods. 
For the purposes of this paper, a single pass-through equation is estimated on food prices using 
available using quarterly data from May 1999 to March 2005
12. Food staples constitute the largest 
share in the CPI and in the average household budget. Food represents about 43 percent of overall 
household expenditure.  The combined food and qhat share of an average household’s budget 
makes up nearly four-fifths of the share of tradable goods in the overall household budget. Since 
data on qhat prices is unavailable, qhat is assumed to have the same pass-through elasticity as 
food.  
 
                                                 
10 Adapted from Campa and Goldberg (2002) 
11 Foreign PPI were estimated for the following trading partners: France, Italy, United Kingdom, Thailand and Japan, 
drawing on data from WEO (2004). 
12 Aggregated quarterly data is available from May 1999 to March 2005 on the following categories of items in the 
CPI: foodstuffs, drinks, tobaccos, clothing and shoes, housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels, furnishing, 
domestic equipment and servicing house, health, transportation, leisure and culture activities, hotels, cafés and 
restaurants and other goods and services   11
The empirical specification of the exchange rate pass-through on food prices entails running a 
regression of the log food price index,  t food  on the log nominal effective exchange rate and log 




(2)   
) 803 . 0 ( ) 046 . 0 ( ) 553 . 0 ( ) 101 . 0 ( ) 002 . 0 (
885 . 0 264 . 0 143 . 0 315 . 0 018 . 0
* * * * * * * * * *
1 7 6 4 t t t t t t efppi neer neer food food ε + + Δ + Δ + Δ + = Δ − − − −  
 
The long-run elasticity for food turns out to be 0.59
14 . For the purposes of this paper, this 
elasticity is used to represent the exchange rate pass-through for all tradable goods. This pass-
through estimate will be used in the subsequent analysis and as a test of sensitivity; the results are 
also reproduced assuming long-run NEER elasticities for tradable goods at 0.5 and 0.7.  
 
4. Estimating the Fiscal Impact of a Nominal Exchange Rate 
Devaluation  
 
The aim of this section is to estimate the first order effect in the short-term of a nominal exchange 
rate devaluation in Djibouti. It first outlines the major channels through which currency 
devaluation is expected to influence the fiscal sector
15. It then calculates the changes in real 
revenue and expenditure in response to a nominal exchange rate devaluation of 30 percent, using 
2004 as a base year. As it will be illustrated, the magnitude of the short-term of the fiscal effect of 
the currency devaluation will depend on the size of the devaluation, the assumptions on exchange 
rate pass-through and whether or not the government introduces wage indexation.  
 
4.1. Fiscal Adjustment to Devaluation: Main Channels  
 
The first-order responses of real fiscal revenue and expenditure to changes in the real exchange 
rate are examined as follows.  
 
4.1.1. Revenue Effects 
 
In Djibouti, the main sources of government revenue are taxes, official grants and military-related 
revenues. Taxes are earned on imported goods (indirect taxes) and on wages, income and profits 
(direct taxes), which are assumed to mainly originate in the non-tradable sector such as the public 
sector. Real government revenue can be written as,  
 
(3)      ( ) P EF M E t Y P t R m n n n / .
* * + + = ,       
 
where R is real government revenue;  n t   and  m t  are the tax rates applied in the non-tradable 
sector and imports respectively, E is the currency price of a unit of foreign exchange or the 
nominal exchange rate, 
* M  is the foreign value of imports, 
* F  is the flow of official grants and 
                                                 
13 See full results in appendix, Table A.1.   
14 This estimates results from using the formula, B(L)/(1-A(L)) = (0.143+0.264)/(1-0.315). 
15 This section draws on Yiheyis (2000) and expands the fiscal framework to incorporate varying degrees of exchange 
pass-through and public wage-indexation. 
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military aid in foreign currency;  n P  is the average price of non-trade goods and services which 
includes the public sector, 
* P  is the foreign price level; and P  is the aggregate price level, 
which is 
δ δ − 1 *) (EP Pn  where δ  is the share of non-tradable goods and services in aggregate 
expenditure. 
 
Assume that  0
~ ~ * * = = ′ = ′ = P t t F m n  (where (~) denotes growth rate) and note 




δ δ − + = . In addition, the assumption of complete-pass through from the 
exchange rate to domestic prices of devaluation is relaxed and it is assumed that prices of non-
tradable goods and services are indexed to the nominal exchange rate, which is a way of 
indirectly reflecting public sector wage indexation
16, i.e.  ( )
β τ E Pn = . Real government revenue 
can be rewritten as, 
 
( ) P EF EM t Y P t R m n n n /
* * + + = , where 
δ τ δ − =
1 *) ( P E P P n and  ()
β τ E Pn =  
 




(4)  {} ( )
* ~ ~ ~
) ) 1 ( ( ) )( 1 (
~
M Y E R m n n n m f η η βτδ η τ δ β η η δτ τ + + − − − + + + − =   
 
 
where  f m η η ,  and  n η  are the revenue shares of imported goods, grants and non-tradable goods 
and services respectively,  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ τ  is the pass-through elasticity and  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ β  is the degree of 
wage indexation. Using the latest data for 2004, the corresponding revenue shares are   
%. 5 . 37 , % 2 . 32 %, 3 . 30 = = = f n m η η η  Hence revenue from foreign currency denominated 
grants and military aid constitutes the largest share. 
 
In static terms, a nominal exchange rate devaluation in Djibouti could increase revenues through 
higher trade taxes by raising import value in terms of local currency. It could also have a positive 
impact on revenues deriving from foreign currency denominated grants. If public sector wages 
were indexed, nominal exchange rate devaluation would also contribute to higher income taxes. 
However, tax revenues from the import sector may fall if import demand declines with a 
devaluation ( 0
~ * < M ) implying that demand is price elastic
18. At the same time, the overall price 
level could rise
19 given Djibouti’s high import content of overall consumption and may cause real 
revenues to decline if the increase in aggregate prices is higher than the gain in nominal 
revenue
20.  
                                                 
16 This is a reasonable assumption for Djibouti considering the relatively large size of the public services in 
the formal non-tradable sector. 
17 See appendix for a fuller derivation of this expression. 
18 In addition, if a currency devaluation is contractionary in the non-tradable sector ( ) 0
~
< n Y , tax revenues would also 
fall.  
19 The magnitude of the overall increase in domestic prices will be dependent on the degree of exchange rate pass-
through 
20 For the purposes of the paper, the growth rate of imports is assumed to remain unaffected by the nominal exchange 
rate devaluation.   13
 
Based on a nominal devaluation of 30%, a pass-through of 60% and indexation of 30%, the 
resulting growth rate of real revenue is 7.86%. This can be divided between nominal revenue 
rising by 22.08% and aggregate price level increases by 14.22%, with the resulting real growth 
rate reflecting the difference. The resulting real revenue level is 
 
(5)       old new R R R )
~
1 ( + = .       
 
Real revenue (deflated by the GDP deflator with 2004 as the base year) was DF 41.5 billion in 
2004. With a growth rate of 7.86% in lieu of a 30% devaluation, the new expected level of real 
government revenues is DF 44.5 billion.  
 
4.1.2. Expenditure Effects 
 
Government expenditure is assumed to be on tradable and non-tradable goods and services, and 
on interest payments on domestic and external debt. In Djibouti, government expenditures on 
non-tradables (wages and salaries) absorb about half of total expenditure. For the purposes of this 
paper, capital expenditure, materials and supplies are assumed to be imported, and therefore are 
considered as expenditures on tradable goods.  
 
Real government expenditure can be expressed as,  
 
(6)      ( )
**
1 ./ nn m G PG EG i E EXD P − =+ +     
 
where  G  is real government expenditure,  n G  is real government expenditure on non-tradable 
goods and services as measured in units of non-tradable goods,  m G  is the foreign value of   
government expenditure on imported goods and  1 − EXD  is the external debt owned by the public 
sector at the end of the previous period; 
* i  is the foreign interest rate and other variables are 
defined as before. Again, incorporating public wage indexation and the possibility of incomplete 




1 ./ nn m GP GE Gi E E X DP
τ
− =++ , and  ( )
β τ E Pn = . 
 
Assuming that external debt will be maintained constant, the adjustment of real government 




(7)  ( ) {} ( ) m m n n n exd m G G E G
~ ~ ~
1 ) 1 (
~
τ ϕ ϕ βτδ τϕ δ β ϕ τδ τ δτϕ + + − + − + + − + = , 
 
where  n m ϕ ϕ ,  and  exd ϕ  denote respectively, the expenditure shares on tradable goods, non-
tradable
22 goods and interest payments on external debt;  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ τ  is the pass-through elasticity 
                                                 
21 See appendix for a fuller derivation of this expression 
22 Non-tradable expenditure items are wages and salaries and transfers. All other expenditure items except 
for interest payments are classified as tradables. Maintenance expenses were treated as tradables due to the 
higher likelihood of expatriate services involved.   14
and  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ β  is the degree of indexation as defined earlier. The expenditure shares in 2004 were 
according,  % 3 . 1 %, 6 . 50 %, 1 . 48 = = = exd n m ϕ ϕ ϕ . 
 
The short-term impact of a nominal exchange rate devaluation is expected to be an increase on 
government expenditure on tradable goods and services and on interest payments (added 
expenditure associated to the local currency cost of foreign debt servicing)
23. At the same time, to 
the extent that currency devaluation raises the aggregate price level, it would lower real wages, 
which is the main component of Djibouti’s’ government expenditure. A nominal exchange rate 
devaluation could also affect government spending if it causes a change in discretionary fiscal 
policy such as raising salaries of public sector employees to protect their real earnings from a 
devaluation-induced rise in prices of consumption goods, a policy which can be reflected by an 
additional increase in government expenditure on non-tradable services. For the purposes of this 
paper, this possibility is captured in the wage indexation method outlined in the discussion on 
revenue, where the growth rate of the price of non-tradable goods,  E P n
~ ~
βτ = . 
 
Based on a nominal devaluation of 30%, a pass-through of 60% and indexation of 30%, the 
resulting growth rate of real government expenditure is -2.43%. This can be divided between 
nominal expenditure rising by 11.79% and aggregate price level increases by 14.22%, with the 
resulting real growth rate reflecting the difference. The resulting real expenditure level is 
 
(8)       old new G G G )
~
1 ( + = .       
 
Real expenditure (deflated by the GDP deflator with 2004 as the base year) was DF 40.1 billion 
in 2004. With a growth rate of -2.43% in lieu of a 30% devaluation, the new expected level of 
real government expenditure is DF 39.1 billion.  
 
4.1.3. Estimating the Real Fiscal Savings from a Nominal Exchange Rate Devaluation 
 
In early 2005 which is the base year for the purposes of the analysis, real fiscal savings was DF 
1.37 billion or 1.16% of GDP. The predicted levels of real fiscal savings after a 30% devaluation 
with 60% pass through, assuming no indexation, which is equation (8) less equation (11), is DF 
6.61 billion or 4.6% of GDP
24. Tables 3 summarizes estimates of fiscal savings under a matrix of 
30%, 60% and 100% devaluation assuming 0% and 30% wage indexation. 
 

















30.0% 6.61 6.28 6.00 5.61 5.40 4.93 3.57 2.91
 % of GDP'05 5.40% 5.13% 4.90% 4.58% 4.41% 4.03% 2.92% 2.38%
60.0% 11.85 11.19 10.64 9.84 9.42 8.50 5.78 4.45
 % of GDP'05 9.68% 9.14% 8.69% 8.04% 7.70% 6.94% 4.72% 3.64%
100.0% 18.84 17.73 16.81 15.49 14.79 13.24 8.71 6.51
 % of GDP'05 15.39% 14.49% 13.73% 12.65% 12.08% 10.82% 7.12% 5.32%
Note: Values are in constant Djibouti Franc terms with the base year of 2004.
Source: Authors' calculation based on EDAM 1996
Devaluation 
Rate
100% pass-through 50% pass-through 60% pass-through 70% pass-through
 
 
                                                 
23 In Djibouti, only a small fraction of government expenditure (0.5%) goes to service external debt.  
 
24 This is expressed as a share of predicted GDP in 2005 which is estimated by the WEO at DF 122.4 billion.   15
Figure 6 graphically displays a convex relationship between the degree of devaluation and real 
fiscal gain as a share of GDP under different pass-through and indexation scenarios.  The 
higher the degree of devaluation, the larger the real fiscal gains in local currency terms. Larger 
pass-through elasticities also raise the fiscal space generated in real terms, though the presence of 
wage indexation in the public sector will dampen the increase.  
 

















































Dashed Lines indicate outcome with 30% public wage indexation.
50% Pass-Through
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on CPI data and WEO 2004. 
 
5.  Social Impact of a Nominal Exchange Rate Devaluation  
 
The purpose of this section is to examine the impact of a potential nominal exchange rate 
devaluation of the Djibouti Franc on poverty, income distribution and real wages. Using 
sampling weights from the household survey, it estimates the real income loss that a Djibouti 
household would on average incur, as a result of a nominal exchange rate devaluation. It moves 
on to estimate the potential fiscal costs in the form of social transfers that would be needed to 
compensate the population for the real income loss engendered by a nominal exchange rate 
devaluation. It also estimates the impact of a currency devaluation on the incidence and depth of 
poverty as well as its distributional impact. (through predicted changes in consumer prices and 
wage income) using a simple model of rural/urban households whose members are primarily 
wage earners. The section ends with an estimation of the impact of a nominal exchange rate 




Three steps are needed in order to determine the distributional and poverty effects of devaluation: 
 
1.  Determine expenditure shares of tradable and non-tradable goods and services including 
wage income from Djibouti’s representative household survey conducted in 1996;  
2.  Using historical data on exchange rates, domestic and world prices to estimate the impact 
of a nominal devaluation on prices in Djibouti;   16
3.  Simulate the effect of devaluation on income distribution and poverty, by tracing the 
impact on the structure of prices and subsequently on real income, proxied by household 
expenditure. 
 
To motivate the empirical work, consider a household’s indirect utility function,  ) , ( y v p  
expressed as a function of prices,  p and household income,  y . Income is derived from the sum 
of wages earned across household members, wl  and self-employment. Though Djibouti 
maintains a currency board with the Djibouti France pegged to the US dollar, movements in other 
currencies relative to the dollar renders the use of the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) 
more appropriate, which can be defined as trade weighted share of bilateral exchange rates with 
Djibouti’s major trading partners.  
 
Consider only first order effects
25, therefore the change in household utility in response to 
changes in devaluation induced prices is: 





















Assume that the marginal utility of income,  1 / = ∂ ∂ y v , and apply Roy’s Identity, 
i i c y v p v − = ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ / / / , where  i c  is the quantity consumed of good i.  Suppressing the 
subscripts for household, h , equation (1) can be rewritten as; 
(10)      ∑ − =
i
i idp c dy du  
Now,  m
m
mdw l dy ∑ =  where  m l  is the labor supply of individual member m of household, h who 
earn wage income. Dividing through by initial household income (or expenditure as a proxy), 
equation (10) becomes, 












θ θ , or in discrete terms, 
 













θ θ  
 
where  y l w m m
w
m / = θ  is the contribution of wages to total income of member m of household h, 
c
i θ  is the share of household expenditure spent on good i and  x x x / ~ Δ = , the percentage change 
                                                 
25 Second order effects which incorporate behavioral responses by consumers could not be considered due to data 
limitations. However, most studies looking at consumption behavior do indicate a large difference between first and 
second order effects. We treat the first-order effects estimated in this study as an upper bound to the welfare cost of 
devaluation.   17
in  variable  x
26. The change in welfare or real income as a percentage of initial income in 
response to a change in the nominal effective exchange rate, can be divided into income and 
consumption effects. On the income side, household’s income will be affected by how wages 
respond to movements in the NEER. On the consumption side, the household’s budget exposure 
to goods that are tradable will determine the cost of devaluation
27. 
 
To compute the welfare measure, income and budget shares can be obtained from the household 
survey. What remains are to determine how wages and consumer prices respond to changes in the 
NEER. Assume that the pass-through coefficient is  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ τ  and E
~
 is the percentage increase in 
the nominal exchange rate (a devaluation), then the percentage change in price,  p ~  in response to 
a devaluation is 
      E p
~ ~ τ = . 
If there exist some degree of public wage indexation captured by the parameter,  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ β , then 
the percentage change in public sector wages, w ~  is given by, 
      p wpub
~ ~ β =  
 
5.2. Main Assumptions 
 
For illustrative purposes, we present results for a nominal exchange rate devaluation of 30 percent 
and with no wage indexation. Subsequently, we will determine the expected real income loss to 
poor households in the population
28 under various exchange rate and wage indexation scenarios. 
To simulate the effect of a 30 percent nominal Djibouti franc devaluation, the following 
assumptions are made:  
 
(i)  Tradable goods consist of food (excluding bread and crepe), tobacco, qhat, school supplies, 
clothing and medical drugs while non-tradable  goods and services are water and electric 
expenses, rent, health services and transportation; 
(ii) Assuming a long-run elasticity of 0.6 for tradable goods, a 30 percent nominal devaluation 
translates into an 18 percent increase for tradable prices. For sensitivity analysis, this exercise 
is repeated assuming 0.5 and 0.7 long-run NEER elasticity for tradable goods; 
(iii) Holding nominal wages fixed, the impact of a real devaluation is felt in terms of a decline in 
purchasing power or real income across households. 
 
Three scenarios are considered, using a pass-through elasticity of 0.5, 0.6 and 0.7 for tradable 
goods which correspond to scenario one, two and three respectively. The higher the degree of 
exchange rate pass-through to domestic prices of tradable goods, the larger the resulting real 
income loss for the population of Djibouti.  
 
                                                 
26 If price data is available for 1996, second-order effects for consumption could be included. Equation (3) 























m p p w
y
W
η θ θ θ  where  i η is the compensated 
own price elasticity for good i. 
27 All services are assumed to be non-tradable. 
28 The household survey used for the analysis is EDAM 1996, which surveys 2380 households from the sedentary 
population in 1996. The survey consists of a household and individual questionnaire. Questions are asked on household 
expenditures and migration and individual level income, education attainment and health status.  
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The social impact of a nominal devaluation on households can be examined from the perspective 
of real income losses, changes in poverty incidence and variations in income distribution.  
 
5.3. Average Household Real Income Loss  
 
Table 4 estimates the average household real income loss as a result of a nominal exchange rate 
devaluation. It presents the results based on equation (11) holding nominal wages fixed, while 
allowing the price of tradable goods to vary in response to a hypothetical nominal devaluation of 
30 percent under different pass-through scenarios. The scenarios are titled first, second and third 
which corresponds to a long-run exchange rate elasticity of 50 percent, 60 percent and 70 percent, 
respectively.  
 
Using a 30 percent nominal devaluation and 60 percent pass-through (Scenario 2), Djibouti 
households would experience on average a real income loss of about 12 percent.  This average 
figure does not however, capture the variation or extent of real income by households across the 
income distribution, proxied by per-capita expenditure. This is shown graphically in Figures 7 
and 8 below using the outcomes under Scenario 2. Most Djibouti households are concentrated in 
the middle-income range, as indicated by peak of the ‘cone’ in Figure 7 and are expected to face a 
loss between 11 and 13 percent of their initial real income.  
 
 
Figure 7 Surface plot: joint density of real income loss share        Figure 8 Contour plot: joint density of real income loss share 
Table 4 Djibouti: Welfare Cost of a 30% Nominal Devaluation
Household Category 1st Scenario 2nd Scenario 3rd Scenario 
Djibouti  9.9 11.9 13.9
Location 
Urban  9.5 11.4 13.4
Rural  11.9 14.3 16.7
Income group 
Poorest  11.4 13.7 16.0
2nd quartile  10.1 12.2 14.2
3rd quartile  9.6 11.5 13.4
Richest  8.6 10.3 12.0
Source: Authors' calculation based on EDAM 1996
% Decline in Real Income
Note: The decline in real income is expressed as a percentage of initial household 
expenditure. 
1st, 2nd and 3rd scenarios corresponds to using a long-run elasticity of traded goods 
prices to the nominal exchange rate of 0.5, 0.6 and 0.7 respectively.  19
Looking further, the negative impact of the currency devaluation on real income varies according 
to gender, location and income group: 
 
•  Rural households bear a larger real income loss, estimated at about 14 percent of real 
income on average compared to 11 percent decline for urban households. 
 
•  Male and female headed households face similar costs, around 12 percent of real 
income on average.  
 
•  Households whose main source of labor income is derived from the tertiary sector 
(public administration, commerce, transportation) bear similar real income loss, estimated at 
about 12 percent on average.  
 
•  Poor households will also be worse off relative to their richer counterparts. Households 
in the lowest income group (25
th percentile) will experience a 14 percent drop in their real income 
on average compared to 10 percent decline for the richest households.  
 
•  Consumption of qhat raises the real income loss to richer groups. The small difference 
between share of real income loss between the poorest and richest groups is due to the larger 
share of qhat consumption in richer households in their overall expenditure. Table 5 shows that if 
only the pass-through effect is considered for food items, the poorest share of real income loss is 
about 1.4 times larger compared to the richest group. However once qhat is added as per the final 
column, the difference in real income loss narrows between the two groups. 
 






welfare cost with 
food & qhat
All 11.9 8.4 10.1
poorest 13.7 11.3 11.9
2nd quartile 12.2 8.9 10.3
3rd quartile 11.5 7.5 9.7
riches 10.3 5.9 8.5
Source: Author's calculation based on EDAM 1996.  
 
 
5.4. Impact on poverty
29 
 
The incidence of extreme and national
30 poverty will rise by 4.4 and 6.3 percentage points 
respectively while the poverty gap
31 is expected to increase by 1.3 (extreme) and 3.0 (national) 
percentage points respectively for the population. Figure 9 shows leftward shifts in the income 
distribution of households associated with greater magnitudes of nominal exchange rate 
devaluation, assuming a pass-through of 60 percent. The vertical height measures the density or 
concentration of households where prior to the devaluation (using the distribution of households 
in 1996), most households were located between the extreme and national poverty lines. As the 
size of the nominal exchange rate devaluation increases, a greater number of households would 
                                                 
29 This section reports the poverty impact of  a nominal devaluation of the magnitude of 30 percent assuming an 
exchange rate pass-through of 60 percent.  
30 Extreme poverty line is 100,229 FDJ (US$566) per adult equivalent or US$ 1.5 per adult per day. The national 
poverty line includes food and non-food consumption, is equivalent to 216,450 FDJ (US$1,223) year or US$ 3.3 per 
adult per day. 
31 The poverty gap (or the depth of poverty) measures how far below is poor households’  per capita income from the 
poverty line. It is expressed as a share of the poverty line.   20
fall below the extreme poverty line. Given Djibouti’s already high rates of poverty incidence, the 
diagram illustrates the detrimental impact of a nominal devaluation exchange on the poor in the 
absence of social transfers that would offset the real income loss experienced by households hurt 
by the currency devaluation.  
 
                          Figure 9: Poverty Impact after Nominal Exchange Rate Devaluation 
20000 80000 300000 1000000
density: Adult-equivalent per-capita household expenditure, 1996
density after 30% nominal devaluation and 60% pass-through
density after 60% nominal devaluation and 60% pass-through
density after 100% nominal devaluation and 60% pass-through
Source: Authors' calculation based on EDAMS 1996
 
 
The negative poverty impact of a currency devaluation varies according to the location of the 
household, the gender of the head of the household, the income group to which the household 
belongs, and to the household’s main source of labor income:   
 
•  Rural households would experience larger declines in extreme poverty relative to 
urban households.  
 
•  17.5 percent of households in the lowest consumption quartile would fall below the 
extreme poverty line and about 20.2 percent of middle-income households in the 3
rd quartile 
will drop below the national poverty line. Looking by income groups, 20.4 percent of middle-
income households in the 3
rd quartile where commerce as the main wage income sources fall 
below the national poverty line, followed by 18.4 percent of households in the same income 
group whose main source of wage income is in public administration. 
 
•  The highest increase in extreme poverty would be experienced by households whose 
main wage source is from commerce (6.5 percentage points) followed by public administration 
(6.1 percentage points).Tables A.2b and A.2d of the appendix provide the outcomes on 
headcount poverty and the poverty gap by households whose main source
32 of wage income is 
derived from the four largest sectors: public administration, services (excluding financial), 
commerce and transport and telecommunications. The incidence of extreme poverty is predicted 
to rise the most, by 7.6 percentage points for households whose main wage income source is from 
services. In terms of the national poverty line, the highest increase is from households whose 
main wage source is from commerce (6.5 percentage points) followed by public administration 
(6.1 percentage points).  
                                                 
32 The sector which is considered the main source of wage income contributes over 90 percent to the overall wage 




Poverty Line   21
 
•  In terms of the poverty gap it appears that households whose main wage earnings are 
from the transport and telecommunication sector experiences the largest fall away from both 
poverty lines. See table A.2d of the appendix. 
 
•  18.7 percent of the poorest households headed by men would fall below the extreme 
poverty line, compared to 14.2 percent of the poorest households headed by women. In absolute 
terms, the incidence of poverty among the poorest households, i.e those in the first quartile, is 
higher among female headed households relative to their male counterparts, though this gap 
narrows, the greater the degree of exchange rate pass-through (Tables A.2a and A.2c of the 
appendix). 
  
•  20.7% of male headed households in the 3
rd quartile fall below the national poverty line 
compared to 18.3% of female headed households.  Male headed households are adversely 
affected more than female headed households due to the larger budget share of qhat consumption 
among male headed households across all income groups.  On average male headed households’s 
share of qhat in overall expenditure is 10.9 percent compared to 4.7 percent for female headed 
households as seen in Table 6. This share reaches the highest among the richest strata of male 




5.5. Impact on income distribution 
 
Income inequality as measured by the Gini index rose slightly across all three scenarios which 
tentatively show that the devaluation exercise will not exacerbate inequality. Again this appears 
to be due to the greater budget share of qhat consumption among the richer segment of the society 
where higher cost due to the devaluation causes a flattening of the post-devaluation income 
distribution.  
 
5.6. Impact on real wages 
 
In the absence of wage indexation, nominal exchange rate devaluation will result in falling 
real public sector wages. With a pass-through elasticity of 60 percent, a 30 percent nominal 
devaluation will cause real public sector wages to fall by 12.6 percent. The higher the pass-
through elasticity and magnitude of devaluation, the greater the fall in real public sector wages as 
in shown in the Appendix Tables A.6 to A.8.  However, if the authorities decide to apply a 30 
percent wage indexation, as it was the case in the past, it will offset the decline in real wages 
engendered by the nominal exchange rate devaluation. It may even lead to a net increase in real 
public sector wages. For example, under the scenario of 30 percent nominal exchange rate 
Table 6: Qhat consumption as a share of total expenditure (%)
Income Categories All Male Head Female Head 
All 9.5 10.9 4.7 
poorest  3.5 4.4 1.1 
2nd quartile  7.5 8.9 3.5 
3rd quartile  12.2 13.3 8.2 
richest  14.7 15.9 8.1 
Households
Source: Authors' calculation based on EDAM 1996  22
devaluation and a 60 percent pass-through, a 30 percent indexation of public wages will cause 
real public sector wages to rise by 1.6 percent.  
 
6.  Estimating Fiscal Savings Net of Social Transfers 
 
6.1. Costing out Social Transfers  
 
As the foregoing analysis shows, a nominal exchange rate devaluation will adversely affect 
households, particularly the poor since most of their expenditure is on tradable goods (food and 
qhat)
33. This section aims to estimate the value of fiscal transfers needed to compensate the poor 
(including those households that would fall below the national poverty line after the devaluation 
and those poor households that experienced a real income loss as a result of the devaluation).  
 
6.1.1. Methodology and Main Assumptions 
 
First, the results regarding the average real income loss to the Djibouti population presented in the 
previous section (based on sample data from the EDAM 1996 household survey) are extrapolated 
to the total population. To arrive at the total cost for the (sedentary) population, it is first assumed 
that for each location sampled, the same proportion of (sedentary) households that are poor in the 
sample also holds true for the population. This implicitly means that the income distribution in 
the household survey sample is the same for the population. The survey design provides the 
number of households in the population for each location in 1996 (for example, see Table A.3a). 
Sample weights, which vary by location, can be determined from the ratio of households in the 
population to the 1996 sample.  
 
A growth rate of 3 percent per year is used to estimate the number of households in the 
population in 2005. The resulting new sample weights are broadly, 25.7 for Djibouti-ville, 15.3 
for other urban areas and 8.5 for rural areas.  These weights are multiplied with the real income 
loss for the sample of poor households for each respective location to derive the cost to poor 
households in the population under various scenarios of wage indexation
34  and degrees of 
nominal exchange rate devaluation. The total real income loss of a nominal exchange rate 
devaluation is estimated by summing across locations. This is assumed to be the value of social 
transfers that the government can anticipate to compensate the affected population for their 
welfare loss.  
 
6.1.2. Costing out the social transfers needed to compensate the poor for their real income loss 
 
Assuming a pass-through elasticity of 60% and no wage indexation, a 30%, 60% and 100% 
nominal devaluation will result in a cost of DF 2.44 billion, 6.29 billion and 14.54 billion 
respectively in social transfers needed to compensate the poor. This is equivalent to 2%, 5.14% 
and 11.88% of GDP respectively. As expected, the cost of social transfers increases with higher 
degrees of devaluation and pass-through elasticity. The results are presented in Tables A.3 to A.5 
of the appendix.  Figure 10 graphically displays what appears to be a convex relationship between 
                                                 
33 Some of the loss may be mitigated by higher nominal wages for households with members working in the public 
sector if the government decides to index wages. Naturally, not all households will benefit from the indexation of 
public wages.  For our purpose, only households where the share of annual income earned from the public sector 
exceeding 90% of total income are assumed to have their wages indexed. These households represent 65% of the total 
households in the sample.   
34 Only households where the share of annual labor income from the public sector exceeding  0.9 have 
wages indexed.   23
the degree of devaluation and real income loss as a share of GDP to households falling below the 
national poverty line under different pass-through and wage indexation assumption. The higher 
the pass-through, the higher the real income loss (though indexation helps to lower losses for a 
given devaluation rate as can be seen from the dashed lines which traces the real income loss 
associated with a 30% public wage indexation). The real income loss also rises at an increasing 
rate, the greater the degree of devaluation.  
 
Figure 10 Djibouti: Relationship between Magnitude of Nominal Devaluation and Real Income Loss to 








































Dashed Lines indicate outcome with 30% public wage indexation.
100% Pass-Through
 
               Source: Authors’ calculation based on WEO, 2004 
 
 
6.2. Estimating Fiscal Savings Net of Social Transfers 
 
Can the Djibouti authorities compensate the poor for their real income loss in the form of 
social transfers and still be left with a positive level of fiscal savings? The previous discussion 
has shown that there will be real income losses to the population in response to a nominal 
exchange rate devaluation, with the poorer segments being particularly hurt. This section 
estimates the real fiscal savings that could be generated by a currency devaluation after having 
accounted for the amount of social transfers needed to compensate its poor population for its real 
income loss.  
 
6.2.1. Methodology and Main Assumptions 
 
Two scenarios are considered. A first scenario assuming no wage indexation and a second 
scenario assuming a 30% wage indexation. The analysis is further disaggregated according to 
four possible exchange rate pass-through (50%, 60%, 70% and 100%). A summary of the results 
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6.2.2. Fiscal savings of a nominal exchange rate devaluation net of social transfers 
 
A 30 percent nominal devaluation with exchange rate pass-through elasticity of 60 percent and 
no wage indexation could generate a net fiscal savings of DF 4.35 billion, equivalent to 3.6 
percent of GDP.  Incorporating a 30 percent public sector wage indexation reduces the net 
savings to 4.25 percent of GDP. As the degree of pass-through rises, the level of net fiscal savings 
falls rapidly and turns negative due to the expansion in the cost of social transfers. With a 100 
percent exchange rate pass-through, the amount of fiscal savings needed to cover social transfers 
fall short of DF 8.8 billion or 7.2 percent of GDP. 
 

















30.0% 4.65 4.50 3.56 3.39 2.40 2.24 -1.29 -1.42
 % of GDP'05 3.80% 3.67% 2.91% 2.77% 1.96% 1.83% -1.05% -1.16%
60.0% 6.99 6.86 4.35 4.25 1.48 1.45 -8.76 -8.25
 % of GDP'05 5.71% 5.60% 3.55% 3.47% 1.21% 1.19% -7.16% -6.74%
100.0% 8.26 8.41 2.27 2.78 -4.23 -3.30 -25.02 -23.24
 % of GDP'05 6.75% 6.87% 1.86% 2.27% -3.46% -2.70% -20.44% -18.98%
Note: Values are in constant Djibouti Franc terms with the base year of 2004.
Source: Authors' calculation based on EDAM 1996
Devaluation 
Rate




Holding all else constant, the higher the pass-through elasticity, the higher the amount of 
social transfers needed to compensate the poor, and the lower the anticipated share of net 
fiscal savings. Figure 11 shows the trade-off between net of transfers, fiscal savings as a share of 
GDP and the degree of nominal devaluation with 0% and 30% (dashed lines) wage indexation. 
Introducing wage indexation slightly raises the expected net fiscal savings due to higher income 
tax revenues. At lower pass through, a higher devaluation rate initially increases net fiscal savings 
though it eventually falls as the devaluation rate rises. As the degree of pass-through overpass 
70%, fiscal savings falls at an increasing rate with rising magnitudes of devaluation. The concave 
pattern describing the relationship between fiscal savings net of transfer and the devaluation rate 
for a given pass-through elasticity is due to the increasing rate of real income loss to the poor 
population with higher devaluation rates.  
 
Figure 11 Djibouti: Relationship between Magnitude of Nominal. Devaluation and Real Fiscal Savings 














Dashed Lines indicate outcome with 30% public wage indexation.
100% Pass-Through
 
                 Source: Authors’ calculation based on WEO, 2004   25
6.3. Estimating net fiscal savings of a nominal exchange rate devaluation assuming 
wage indexation  
 
 
It is possible to just offset the decline in purchasing power of civil servants through wage 
indexation while still generating net fiscal savings. Table A.9 in the appendix provides the level 
of indexation needed to maintain real public sector wages constant under a 30 percent and 60 
percent nominal devaluation scenario. As expected the higher the pass-through for a given 
exchange rate devaluation, the greater the degree of indexation required. For example, under a 30 
percent nominal devaluation scenario with a 60 percent pass-through, a wage indexation of 
approximately 13.4 percent will keep real public sector wages constant while still generating a net 
fiscal savings of 2.86 percent. Higher levels of exchange rate pass-through will reduce the net 
fiscal savings while raising the degree of indexation required to maintain real wages constant. 
 
7. Conclusions  
 
The rationale for a currency devaluation does not lie on the potential economic gains. Given 
the structure of Djibouti’s economy, a nominal exchange rate devaluation is likely to be 
contractionary in the short-term. Unlike many other Sub-Saharan countries, Djibouti has a 
limited domestic productive capacity and a negligible tradable sector. The economic impact of a 
currency devaluation may be limited in the short-term owing to the lack of a supply response of 
the tradable sector. At the same time, the negative impact on aggregate demand could be sizeable. 
Aggregate private consumption will likely fall, due to the real income loss caused by the 
devaluation. Given the high dependency of the economy on imports of intermediate and capital 
goods, the higher relative prices of these goods will tend to reduce private investment demand in 
the non-tradable sector.  
 
Given Djibouti’s fiscal structure, a currency devaluation could engender substantial fiscal 
savings which could be reallocated to the attainment of the MDGs and to poverty reduction.  A 
currency devaluation will boost the real value of revenues since the exchange rate typically 
depreciates more than the price level in the short term. The paper estimates that the first order 
effect of 30 percent nominal exchange rate devaluation could generate fiscal savings ranging 
from 3 to 7 percent of GDP (depending on the degree of exchange rate pass-through).  
 
However, the short-term social costs of a currency devaluation may prove high. Assuming a 30 
percent nominal devaluation, the incidence of poverty could rise by 5-6 percentage points. About 
17 percent of households in the lowest consumption quartile could fall below the extreme poverty 
line and 20 percent of middle-income households (in the 3
rd quartile) could drop below the 
national poverty line.  
 
Assuming that the government decides to provide social transfers to compensate the poor for 
their real income loss caused by the devaluation, such policy measure could still generate net 
fiscal savings. A 30 percent nominal devaluation could generate between 1 and 3 percent of GDP 
of fiscal savings net of social transfers needed to compensate the poor for their real income loss. 
The size of the net fiscal savings will depend on the magnitude of the devaluation, the exchange 
rate pass-through, and the effective enforcement of wage policy controls.  
 
Djibouti’s lack of experience with formal social safety nets limits the government’s readiness to 
provide well-targeted and timely social transfers to compensate the poor for their real income 
loss caused by a currency devaluation.  Setting up an effective system of social safety nets   26
should be a short-term priority. It will help the government address the needs of the poor in good 
economic times and be adaptable to combat the adverse effect of eventual shocks.      
  
A number of issues that were not discussed in the paper merit further analysis. A nominal 
exchange rate devaluation raises issues of the appropriate size and policy sequencing. First, 
there is the issue of the size of the exchange rate adjustment. Djibouti might need to implement a 
large enough adjustment in the exchange rate that would be perceived as sufficient to restore 
external competitiveness and achieve substantial fiscal consolidation. At the same time, the larger 
the size of the devaluation the larger the adverse social impact and the smaller the fiscal savings 
that could be generated. Second, a nominal devaluation if it is not accompanied by sustained 
efforts to maintain macroeconomic fundamentals will not be sufficient to achieve the desired 
impact on the equilibrium real exchange rate and the expected impact on fiscal consolidation.   
 
The paper did not address the discussion of exit strategies from the currency board 
arrangement after the exchange rate adjustment. The currency board has provided financial 
stability, although it has not prevented the emergence of substantial fiscal and current account 
deficits. One possibility is to move to a flexible exchange rate. Djibouti’s main trading partners 
(Ethiopia and Yemen) have already moved to a floating exchange rate regime. But moving to a 
flexible exchange rate regime involves significant administrative and political economy 
challenges to Djibouti policy makers. The Central Bank currently lacks the technical capacity to 
adopt and enforce the institutional requirements to establish a new nominal anchor (such as broad 
money targeting). In addition, Djibouti has a strong executive with limited checks and balances, 
and it remains unclear whether the Central Bank’s independence could be preserved so as to 
adopt a monetary policy that would signal strong commitment to price stability. An alternative 
exit to the currency board could be pegging the Djibouti franc to a basket of currencies of its main 
trading partners, with the exchange rate fluctuating within a narrow margin that can be gradually 
widened in parallel with the strengthening of the Central Bank’s institutional capacity.  
 
In the absence of a more flexible exchange rate management, the only option available to the 
government to resolve the problem of high factor costs and create additional fiscal space is to 
speed up public sector and structural reforms.  As discussed in the Djibouti Country Economic 
Memorandum (2006) these policies could aim at: a) reforming the government pay and 
employment policies; b) removing bottlenecks to private sector investment; c) investing in 
highly-skilled vocational training; and d) reducing the price and improving the quality of 
backbone services (telecommunications, water, electricity, transports, finance).    27
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ANNEX 1.     MAIN TRANSMISSION CHANNELS THROUGH WHICH A CURRENCY 
DEVALUATION COULD AFFECT DJIBOUTI’S ECONOMY 
 
 
In view of the data limitations to estimate the first and second-order macroeconomic effects of a 
currency devaluation in Djibouti
35, this appendix aims to provide a brief qualitative account of the 
main transmission channels through which a nominal exchange rate devaluation could affect 
Djibouti’s economy.  
 
External Balance. A decline in domestic real income after the devaluation is expected to reduce 
imports in U.S. dollar terms, which should improve the current account balance. However with 
half of the broad money held in foreign currency deposits, the private sector would probably draw 
down these deposits to offset the fall in real income, thereby dampening the impact of devaluation 
on import demand. Expatriate and foreign troop demand will not likely be affected by the 
devaluation as they are paid in foreign currency.  
 
Real Sector. It is unlikely that devaluation would generate any supply response in the short-term 
owing to Djibouti’s current limited local productive capacity. A reduction in real wage prices by 
itself might not attract foreign investors, because other factors are negatively affecting profit 
prospects (i.e. low appropriability of investments owing to weak protection of property rights). 
Moreover, if the authorities resort to public wage indexation to compensate for the decline in real 
earnings of civil servants the initial impact of the devaluation on unit labor costs could be 
partially offset by any discretionary increase in nominal public wages. Even if the real wages are 
lowered significantly after a devaluation, the limited supply response may lead to a negative 
impact on private investment and labor demand which could further exacerbate formal 
unemployment.  
 
Banking Sector. The Central Bank would see an increase in the excess coverage of the currency 
board and commercial banks would continue to have a positive foreign currency position (assets 
exceed foreign exchange liabilities).  However, given Djibouti’s high levels of financial openness 
and the high share of total deposits denominated in foreign currency, an anticipated depreciation 
may lead to capital flight, forcing lending interest rates to rise temporarily. Higher interest rates 
could also have a negative impact on private investment demand.  
 
                                                 
35 The decision to devalue depends fundamentally on the degree of misalignment; on whether there will be medium to 
long-term economic gains and the speed to which internal adjustment mechanisms are likely to restore macroeconomic 
balances to ensure that the real exchange rate returns to its long-run equilibrium rate. However, measuring the degree of 
misalignment is difficult because it requires estimating the long—run equilibrium real exchange rate, which remains 
one of the most challenging empirical problems in open economy macroeconomics (Edwards 1989, Williamson 1994, 
Hinkle et al, 1995). A fundamental difficulty is that the equilibrium value of the real exchange rate is not observable. 
Standard macroeconomic theory tells us, however, that the equilibrium real exchange rate is a function of observable 
macroeconomic ‘fundamentals’(such as government spending variables and the terms of trade), and that the actual real 
exchange rate approaches the equilibrium rate over time (Devarajan et al, 1993, Montiel, 1997). A recent strand of the 
empirical literature exploits these observations to develop a single-equation approach to estimating the equilibrium real 
exchange rate and the degree of misalignment (Baffes et al, 1997).   But this econometric approach is data-intensive 
and inherits all the limitations of developing country data. The econometric results are often not robust. The overall 
statistical significance is highly sensitive to the choice of proxies for the macroeconomic fundamentals and to the real 
exchange rate estimation procedure. In countries like Djibouti, time series data limitations prove acute particularly 
when the notion of long-run equilibrium is required to carry so much weight in short samples.   
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Fiscal Accounts.  The fiscal effect of devaluation can be divided between a revenue and 
expenditure effect (see Section 4 of the paper for a more detailed account of the link between the 
real exchange rate and the fiscal accounts): 
 
•  Revenue Effects. The main sources of government revenue in Djibouti are taxes, grants and 
military aid. In static terms, a real devaluation would increase real revenues by raising real 
trade taxes (primarily on imports) by raising their value in terms of local currency and also 
generate a gain on foreign currency denominated grants and military aid. The tax base may 
shrink if import demand falls and furthermore if import demand is price elastic, revenues 
from this sector will decline.  
 
•  Expenditure Effects. Government expenditure can be decomposed into expenditure on trade 
and non-traded goods and services and interest payments on domestic and external debt. The 
immediate or static impact of devaluation is to raise government expenditure on traded goods 
and the local currency cost of foreign debt servicing which is marginal in Djibouti. 
Government spending will also be affected if devaluation causes a change in discretionary 
fiscal policy such as raising salaries of public sector employees to protect their real earnings 
from a devaluation-induced rise in prices of consumption goods.  
   30
ANNEX II.  TECHNICAL APPENDIX 
 
 
Table A.1 Djibouti: Exchange Rate Pass Through for Food Index (Q2:99-Q1:04) 
Variables Coefficients Std. Error
constant 0.018 *** (0.00)
log_food t-4 0.315 ** (0.10)
log_neer t-6 0.143 ** (0.06)
log_neer t-7 0.264 *** (0.05)
log_efppi t-1 0.885 (0.80)
dummy_Q2y02 -0.015 ** (0.00)
F(5,6) 132.43  
    Notes: 
1.  Standard errors are corrected for serial correlation and heterogeneity using Newey-West 
method with 10 lags.  
 2.     *** denotes significance at the 1% level and ** at the 5% level. 
3.  Dummy variable is for turning point when the nominal effective exchange rate begins to 
depreciate in the 2
nd quarter (Q) of 2002. 
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Begin with the expression,  
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Dividing through by  G  and that   n m ϕ ϕ ,  and  exd ϕ  denotes respectively, the expenditure shares 
on tradable goods, non-tradable goods and interest payments on external debt, gives 
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Table A.2a Djibouti: Poverty Impact of a Potential 30% Nominal Devaluation (Headcount Ratio)
Households Extreme National Extreme National Extreme National Extreme National
All Djibouti 13.4 48.7 17.2 53.9 17.8 55.0 18.9 56.5
Location
Urban 8.2 42.1 11.1 47.6 11.7 48.8 12.6 50.4
Rural 39.5 82.1 47.4 85.6 48.1 86.4 50.6 86.9
Household Head
Male 11.9 46.3 15.7 51.3 16.3 52.6 17.5 54.1
Female 18.6 57.1 22.3 63.1 22.8 63.5 23.7 64.6
Overall Income group
Poorest 53.6 100.0 68.8 100.0 71.1 100.0 75.6 100.0
2nd quartile 0.0 95.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
3rd quartile 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.8 0.0 20.2 0.0 25.9
Richest 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Male Head: Income group
Poorest 50.7 100.0 66.9 100.0 69.4 100.0 74.5 100.0
2nd quartile 0.0 95.5 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
3rd quartile 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.5 0.0 20.7 0.0 26.7
Richest 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Female Head: Income group
Poorest 61.3 100.0 73.6 100.0 75.5 100.0 78.5 100.0
2nd quartile 0.0 93.5 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
3rd quartile 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.8 0.0 18.3 0.0 22.9




Source: Authors' calculation based on EDAM 1996
1. Extreme poverty line is Fdj 100,229 (USD 1.55/day) while the National Poverty Line is Fdj 216,450 (USD 3.35/day) 
in 1996.
2. 1st, 2nd and 3rd scenarios correspond to using a long-run elasticity of traded good prices to the nominal exchange 
rate of 0.5, 0.6 and 0.7 respectively.
a/ Households were ranked by adult equivalent expenditure.
40.8 41.5 41.7 41.9
3rd Scenario (70% 
pass through)
Post-Devaluation Poverty (% of population)
Pre-Devaluation 
Poverty  (% of 
population)
1st Scenario     
(50% pass 
through)
2nd Scenario (60% 
pass through)
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 Table A.2b Djibouti: Poverty Impact of a Potential 30% Nominal Devaluation (Headcount Ratio)
Households Extreme National Extreme National Extreme National Extreme National
All Djibouti 13.4 48.7 17.2 53.9 17.8 55.0 18.9 56.5
By Main Wage Source:
Public Administration  8.7 39.8 11.5 45.0 11.9 45.9 13.1 48.0
Services 7.6 44.1 14.7 47.6 15.3 48.8 15.9 51.8
Commerce 12.9 49.8 16.6 54.4 17.5 56.2 18.0 58.5
Transport and Telecommunication 6.9 30.4 9.8 33.3 9.8 34.3 10.8 35.3
Main Wage Source: Public Administration
Poorest 51.1 100.0 67.4 100.0 69.6 100.0 77.2 100.0
2nd quartile 0.0 96.1 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
3rd quartile 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.1 0.0 18.4 0.0 25.7
Richest 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Main Wage Source: Services
Poorest 33.3 100.0 64.1 100.0 66.7 100.0 69.2 100.0
2nd quartile 0.0 97.3 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
3rd quartile 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.6 0.0 14.9 0.0 25.5
Richest 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Main Wage Source: Commerce
Poorest 52.8 100.0 67.9 100.0 71.7 100.0 73.6 100.0
2nd quartile 0.0 94.8 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
3rd quartile 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.0 0.0 20.4 0.0 29.6
Richest 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Main Wage Source: Transport & Telecom
Poorest 50.0 100.0 71.4 100.0 71.4 100.0 78.6 100.0
2nd quartile 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0
3rd quartile 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.5 0.0 16.7 0.0 20.8
Richest 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: Authors' calculation based on EDAM 1996
1. Extreme poverty line is Fdj 100,229 (USD 1.55/day) while the National Poverty Line is Fdj 216,450 (USD 3.35/day) in 1996.




2nd Scenario     
(60% pass through)
1st Scenario   (50% 
pass through)
2. 1st, 2nd and 3rd scenarios correspond to using a long-run elasticity of traded good prices to the nominal exchange rate of 0.5, 0.6 and 0.7 
respectively.
Post-Devaluation Poverty (% of population)
Notes:
3. There were 603 households where wage earnings from public administration formed over 90 percent of the total wage income earned by the 
household. Similarly, 183 households had earnings from services were over 90% of the total, 245 from commerce and 114 from transport and 
telecommunication.
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 Table A.2c Djibouti: Poverty Impact of a Potential 30% Nominal Devaluation (Poverty Gap)
Households Extreme National Extreme National Extreme National Extreme National
All Djibouti 31.3 38.8 31.9 41.3 32.6 41.8 32.4 42.2
Location
Urban 27.7 34.2 27.4 36.7 27.9 37.2 27.7 37.5
Rural 35.1 50.4 37.2 54.1 38.4 54.9 38.3 55.6
Household Head
Male      (77.4%) 30.7 38.0 30.8 40.7 31.4 41.0 31.1 41.3
Female (22.6%) 32.8 40.9 34.8 43.1 35.7 44.1 36.0 44.7
Overall Income group
Poorest 31.3 57.3 31.9 62.1 32.6 63.1 32.4 64.1
2nd quartile - 19.2 - 26.5 - 28.1 - 29.8
3rd quartile - - - 3.4 - 4.7 - 5.7
Richest - - - - - - - -
Male Head: Income group
Poorest 30.7 56.5 30.8 61.4 31.4 62.4 31.1 63.4
2nd quartile - 19.0 - 26.4 - 28.1 - 29.8
3rd quartile - - - 3.2 - 4.4 - 5.4
Richest - - - - - - - -
Female Head: Income group
Poorest 32.8 59.4 34.8 64.0 35.7 65.0 36.0 65.9
2nd quartile - 20.0 - 26.6 - 28.2 - 29.8
3rd quartile - - - 3.8 - 5.8 - 6.7




Source: Authors' calculation based on EDAM 1996
40.8 41.5 41.7 41.9
3rd Scenario    
(70% pass through)
Post-Devaluation Poverty Gap (%)
Pre-Devaluation 
Poverty  Gap (%)
1st Scenario     
(50% pass through)
2nd Scenario   
(60% pass through)
3. 1st, 2nd and 3rd scenarios correspond to using a long-run elasticity of traded good prices to the nominal exchange rate of 
0.5, 0.6 and 0.7 respectively.
a/ Households were ranked by adult equivalent expenditure.
1. Extreme per-capita poverty line is Fdj 100,229 (USD 1.55/day) while the National Poverty Line is Fdj 216,450 (USD 
3.35/day) in 1996. 
2. The poverty gap is defined as (1-average per-capita  income/poverty line) for households below the poverty line.
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 Table A.2d Djibouti: Poverty Impact of a Potential 30% Nominal Devaluation (Poverty Gap)
Households Extreme National Extreme National Extreme National Extreme National
All Djibouti 31.3 38.8 31.9 41.3 32.6 41.8 32.4 42.2
By Main Wage Source:
Public Administration  30.6 34.6 30.9 37.2 31.8 37.9 30.5 37.6
Services 27.2 36.3 21.2 40.0 22.3 40.4 23.5 39.5
Commerce 24.9 37.2 27.2 40.5 27.6 40.5 28.8 40.3
Transport and Telecommunication 13.6 33.5 20.0 37.6 22.3 38.0 22.5 38.5
Main Wage Source: Public Administration
Poorest 30.6 56.8 30.9 61.8 31.8 62.8 30.5 63.8
2nd quartile - 18.0 - 25.7 - 27.4 - 29.1
3rd quartile - . - 2.6 - 4.2 - 4.9
Richest - . - - - - - -
Main Wage Source: Services
Poorest 27.2 52.9 21.2 58.1 22.3 59.1 23.5 60.1
2nd quartile - 18.4 - 26.0 - 27.6 - 29.2
3rd quartile - - - 2.7 - 4.2 - 4.3
Richest - - - - - - - -
Main Wage Source: Commerce
Poorest 24.9 55.3 27.2 60.3 27.6 61.3 28.8 62.2
2nd quartile - 19.8 - 26.8 - 28.5 - 30.1
3rd quartile - - - 3.5 - 3.9 - 4.6
Richest - - - - - - - -
Main Wage Source: Transport & Telecom
Poorest 13.6 52.8 20.0 58.5 22.3 59.7 22.5 60.8
2nd quartile - 17.6 - 26.2 - 27.9 - 29.6
3rd quartile - - - 4.0 - 5.2 - 6.2
Richest - - - - - - - -
Source: Authors' calculation based on EDAM 1996
3. 1st, 2nd and 3rd scenarios correspond to using a long-run elasticity of traded good prices to the nominal exchange rate of 0.5, 0.6 and 0.7 
respectively.




1st Scenario     
(60% pass through)
1st Scenario     
(50% pass through)
4. There were 603 households where wage earnings from public administration formed over 90 percent of the total wage income earned by the 
household. Similarly, 183 households had earnings from services were over 90% of the total, 245 from commerce and 114 for transport and 
telecommunication.
Post-Devaluation Poverty (% of population)
Notes:
1. Extreme poverty line is Fdj 100,229 (USD 1.55/day) while the National Poverty Line is Fdj 216,450 (USD 3.35/day) in 1996.
2. The poverty gap is defined as (1-average per-capita  income/poverty line) for households below the poverty line.  36
Figure A.3 Djibouti: Surface plot of joint density of real income loss as a % of initial 




Figure A.4 Djibouti: Contour plot of joint density of real income loss as a % of initial 
expenditure against log  per-capita expenditure in 1996 using 60% pass-through. 
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djibouti-ville 1 315 6195 8083 25.7 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.20 0.01 0.24 0.02 0.41
djibouti-ville - 484 9519 12420 25.7 0.02 0.42 0.02 0.53 0.03 0.66 0.04 1.09
djibouti-ville - 152 2989 3900 25.7 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.12 0.01 0.24
djibouti-ville - 363 7139 9315 25.7 0.02 0.43 0.02 0.52 0.02 0.63 0.04 0.95
djibouti-ville - 277 5507 7185 25.9 0.01 0.29 0.01 0.36 0.02 0.43 0.03 0.70
ali-sabieh urbai 147 1728 2255 15.3 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.16 0.02 0.25
dikhil urbain 124 1457 1901 15.3 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.18
arta, wea 44 517 675 15.3 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.08
obock urbain 25 293 382 15.3 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03
tadjourah urbain 52 624 814 15.7 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.07
ali-sabieh rural 125 813 1061 8.5 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.12
dikhil rural 77 500 652 8.5 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.06
djibouti rural 114 741 967 8.5 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.08
tadjourah rural 81 545 711 8.8 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.06
Total 2380 38567 50321 21.1 0.09 1.78 0.11 2.22 0.13 2.69 0.21 4.33
  % of 2005 GDP - - - - 0.07 1.46 0.09 1.81 0.11 2.20 0.17 3.54
100% pass-through
Note: Cost is expressed in billions of 2004 DF. Number of sedentary households (HH) in 1996 are taken from the EDAM 1996 sample design 
while the numbers in 2005 are obtained by assuming an annual growth rate of 3% since 1996.





























djibouti-ville 1 315 6195 8083 25.7 0.02 0.46 0.02 0.60 0.03 0.78 0.07 1.88
djibouti-ville - 484 9519 12420 25.7 0.05 1.24 0.07 1.69 0.09 2.20 0.17 4.27
djibouti-ville - 152 2989 3900 25.7 0.01 0.30 0.01 0.38 0.02 0.51 0.04 1.07
djibouti-ville - 363 7139 9315 25.7 0.04 1.05 0.05 1.37 0.07 1.67 0.11 2.84
djibouti-ville - 277 5507 7185 25.9 0.03 0.76 0.04 0.95 0.05 1.17 0.07 1.89
ali-sabieh urbai 147 1728 2255 15.3 0.02 0.28 0.02 0.36 0.03 0.45 0.05 0.70
dikhil urbain 124 1457 1901 15.3 0.01 0.21 0.02 0.27 0.02 0.34 0.04 0.58
arta, wea 44 517 675 15.3 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.19
obock urbain 25 293 382 15.3 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.10
tadjourah urbain 52 624 814 15.7 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.19
ali-sabieh rural 125 813 1061 8.5 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.20 0.03 0.29
dikhil rural 77 500 652 8.5 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.14
djibouti rural 114 741 967 8.5 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.24
tadjourah rural 81 545 711 8.8 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.16
Total 2380 38567 50321 21.1 0.24 4.86 0.30 6.29 0.38 7.94 0.68 14.54
  % of 2005 GDP - - - - 0.19 3.97 0.25 5.14 0.31 6.49 0.55 11.88
70% pass-through
Note: Cost is expressed in billions of 2004 DF. Number of sedentary households (HH) in 1996 are taken from the EDAM 1996 sample design 





50% pass-through 60% pass-through
 























djibouti-ville 1 315 6195 8083 25.7 0.02 0.41 0.02 0.54 0.03 0.71 0.06 1.61
djibouti-ville - 484 9519 12420 25.7 0.04 1.09 0.06 1.47 0.08 1.94 0.14 3.70
djibouti-ville - 152 2989 3900 25.7 0.01 0.24 0.01 0.34 0.02 0.44 0.04 0.94
djibouti-ville - 363 7139 9315 25.7 0.04 0.95 0.05 1.23 0.06 1.52 0.10 2.51
djibouti-ville - 277 5507 7185 25.9 0.03 0.70 0.03 0.86 0.04 1.06 0.07 1.73
ali-sabieh urbai 147 1728 2255 15.3 0.02 0.25 0.02 0.31 0.02 0.38 0.04 0.61
dikhil urbain 124 1457 1901 15.3 0.01 0.18 0.01 0.23 0.02 0.27 0.03 0.46
arta, wea 44 517 675 15.3 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.18
obock urbain 25 293 382 15.3 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.08
tadjourah urbain 52 624 814 15.7 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.16
ali-sabieh rural 125 813 1061 8.5 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.17 0.03 0.25
dikhil rural 77 500 652 8.5 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.13
djibouti rural 114 741 967 8.5 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.23
tadjourah rural 81 545 711 8.8 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.12
Total 2380 38567 50321 21.1 0.21 4.33 0.27 5.59 0.33 7.04 0.59 12.71
  % of 2005 GDP - - - - 0.17 3.54 0.22 4.57 0.27 5.75 0.48 10.38
70% pass-through
Note: Cost is expressed in billions of 2004 DF. Number of sedentary households (HH) in 1996 are taken from the EDAM 1996 sample design 





50% pass-through 60% pass-through
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djibouti-ville 1 315 6195 8083 25.7 0.05 1.16 0.07 1.88 0.11 2.94 0.24 6.13
djibouti-ville - 484 9519 12420 25.7 0.12 2.96 0.17 4.27 0.21 5.49 0.40 10.14
djibouti-ville - 152 2989 3900 25.7 0.03 0.80 0.04 1.07 0.06 1.49 0.12 3.02
djibouti-ville - 363 7139 9315 25.7 0.08 2.16 0.11 2.84 0.14 3.56 0.23 5.81
djibouti-ville - 277 5507 7185 25.9 0.06 1.46 0.07 1.89 0.09 2.39 0.15 3.84
ali-sabieh urbai 147 1728 2255 15.3 0.04 0.56 0.05 0.70 0.06 0.87 0.08 1.30
dikhil urbain 124 1457 1901 15.3 0.03 0.45 0.04 0.58 0.04 0.68 0.06 0.99
arta, wea 44 517 675 15.3 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.19 0.02 0.24 0.02 0.38
obock urbain 25 293 382 15.3 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.13 0.02 0.25
tadjourah urbain 52 624 814 15.7 0.01 0.15 0.01 0.19 0.02 0.24 0.03 0.42
ali-sabieh rural 125 813 1061 8.5 0.03 0.23 0.03 0.29 0.04 0.34 0.06 0.49
dikhil rural 77 500 652 8.5 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.17 0.03 0.24
djibouti rural 114 741 967 8.5 0.02 0.18 0.03 0.24 0.04 0.30 0.05 0.45
tadjourah rural 81 545 711 8.8 0.01 0.13 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.19 0.03 0.27
Total 2380 38567 50321 21.1 0.50 10.57 0.68 14.54 0.87 19.02 1.51 33.73
  % of 2005 GDP - - - - 0.41 8.64 0.55 11.88 0.71 15.54 1.24 27.56
Note: Cost is expressed in billions of 2004 DF. Number of sedentary households (HH) in 1996 are taken from the EDAM 1996 sample design 
while the numbers in 2005 are obtained by assuming an annual growth rate of 3% since 1996.





























djibouti-ville 1 315 6195 8083 25.7 0.04 1.03 0.06 1.61 0.10 2.46 0.21 5.31
djibouti-ville - 484 9519 12420 25.7 0.10 2.61 0.14 3.70 0.19 4.77 0.35 8.91
djibouti-ville - 152 2989 3900 25.7 0.03 0.69 0.04 0.94 0.05 1.26 0.10 2.54
djibouti-ville - 363 7139 9315 25.7 0.08 1.93 0.10 2.51 0.12 3.15 0.21 5.29
djibouti-ville - 277 5507 7185 25.9 0.05 1.31 0.07 1.73 0.09 2.21 0.14 3.54
ali-sabieh urbai 147 1728 2255 15.3 0.03 0.48 0.04 0.61 0.05 0.76 0.07 1.10
dikhil urbain 124 1457 1901 15.3 0.02 0.38 0.03 0.46 0.04 0.56 0.05 0.82
arta, wea 44 517 675 15.3 0.01 0.15 0.01 0.18 0.01 0.21 0.02 0.36
obock urbain 25 293 382 15.3 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.22
tadjourah urbain 52 624 814 15.7 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.20 0.02 0.36
ali-sabieh rural 125 813 1061 8.5 0.02 0.20 0.03 0.25 0.03 0.29 0.05 0.43
dikhil rural 77 500 652 8.5 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.22
djibouti rural 114 741 967 8.5 0.02 0.17 0.03 0.23 0.03 0.28 0.05 0.42
tadjourah rural 81 545 711 8.8 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.22
Total 2380 38567 50321 21.1 0.44 9.33 0.59 12.71 0.76 16.55 1.33 29.75
  % of 2005 GDP - - - - 0.36 7.62 0.48 10.38 0.62 13.52 1.09 24.30
Note: Cost is expressed in billions of 2004 DF. Number of sedentary households (HH) in 1996 are taken from the EDAM 1996 sample design 
while the numbers in 2005 are obtained by assuming an annual growth rate of 3% since 1996.
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Gov. Revenue  45.57 9.8% Gov. Revenue  45.61 9.9%
Gov. Expenditure  38.96 -2.9% Gov. Expenditure  39.33 -2.0%
Fiscal Savings 6.61 382.1% Fiscal Savings 6.28 358.0%
   As % of  real GDP in 2005 5.40% 4.24%    As % of  real GDP in 2005 5.13% 3.97%
Less:Social Transfers (ST) 1.96 - Less:Social Transfers (ST) 1.78 -
Fiscal Savings Net of ST 4.65 - Fiscal Savings Net of ST 4.50 -
   As % of  real GDP in 2005 3.80% 2.63%    As % of  real GDP in 2005 3.67% 2.51%





Gov. Revenue  44.69 7.7% Gov. Revenue  44.74 7.9%
Gov. Expenditure  38.69 -3.5% Gov. Expenditure  39.14 -2.4%
Fiscal Savings 6.00 337.8% Fiscal Savings 5.61 308.9%
   As % of  real GDP in 2005 4.90% 3.74%    As % of  real GDP in 2005 4.58% 3.42%
Less:Social Transfers (ST) 2.44 - Less:Social Transfers (ST) 2.22 -
Fiscal Savings Net of ST 3.56 - Fiscal Savings Net of ST 3.39 -
   As % of  real GDP in 2005 2.91% 1.75%    As % of  real GDP in 2005 2.77% 1.60%





Gov. Revenue  43.82 5.6% Gov. Revenue  43.88 5.8%
Gov. Expenditure  38.43 -4.2% Gov. Expenditure  38.95 -2.9%
Fiscal Savings 5.40 293.5% Fiscal Savings 4.93 259.8%
   As % of  real GDP in 2005 4.41% 3.24%    As % of  real GDP in 2005 4.03% 2.87%
Less:Social Transfers (ST) 3.00 - Less:Social Transfers (ST) 2.69 -
Fiscal Savings Net of ST 2.40 - Fiscal Savings Net of ST 2.24 -
   As % of  real GDP in 2005 1.96% 0.80%    As % of  real GDP in 2005 1.83% 0.67%





Gov. Revenue  41.21 -0.7% Gov. Revenue  41.29 -0.5%
Gov. Expenditure  37.64 -6.2% Gov. Expenditure  38.38 -4.3%
Fiscal Savings 3.57 160.6% Fiscal Savings 2.91 112.4%
   As % of  real GDP in 2005 2.92% 1.76%    As % of  real GDP in 2005 2.38% 1.22%
Less:Social Transfers (ST) 4.86 - Less:Social Transfers (ST) 4.33 -
Fiscal Savings Net of ST -1.29 - Fiscal Savings Net of ST -1.42 -
   As % of  real GDP in 2005 -1.05% -2.22%    As % of  real GDP in 2005 -1.16% -2.32%
Real Public Sector Wages -21.0% Real Public Sector Wages 6.3%
Notes:
1. Welfare estimates exclude private sector cost of higher nominal wages.
Source: Author's calculation based on WEO 2004
2. The percentage change column for the share of real fiscal savings to GDP refers to percentage point difference 
3. Social Transfers is equivalent to the estimated real income loss to households that will fall below the absolute 
poverty line (1996 base) after the devaluation.
4. Wage indexation is only applicable to households where the ratio of public sector income to total income  
exceeds 90%.
5. Real GDP in 2005 is forecasted at DF 122.4 billion (using 2004 as the base year).
Predicted Real Levels '05 (DF bil) Predicted Real Levels '05 (DF bil)
100% pass through 100% pass through
30% Wage Indexation 0% Wage Indexation
50% pass through 50% pass through
60% pass through 60% pass through
70% pass through 70% pass through
Predicted Real Levels '05 (DF bil) Predicted Real Levels '05 (DF bil)
Predicted Real Levels '05 (DF bil) Predicted Real Levels '05 (DF bil)
Predicted Real Levels '05 (DF bil) Predicted Real Levels '05 (DF bil)
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Gov. Revenue  49.65 19.7% Gov. Revenue  49.73 19.9%
Gov. Expenditure  37.80 -5.8% Gov. Expenditure  38.54 -3.9%
Fiscal Savings 11.85 764.2% Fiscal Savings 11.19 716.0%
   As % of  real GDP in 2005 9.68% 8.52%    As % of  real GDP in 2005 9.14% 7.98%
Less:Social Transfers (ST) 4.86 - Less:Social Transfers (ST) 4.33 -
Fiscal Savings Net of ST 6.99 - Fiscal Savings Net of ST 6.86 -
   As % of  real GDP in 2005 5.7% 4.54%    As % of  real GDP in 2005 5.6% 4.44%





Gov. Revenue  47.90 15.5% Gov. Revenue  48.00 15.7%
Gov. Expenditure  37.27 -7.1% Gov. Expenditure  38.16 -4.9%
Fiscal Savings 10.64 675.6% Fiscal Savings 9.84 617.8%
   As % of  real GDP in 2005 8.7% 7.5%    As % of  real GDP in 2005 8.0% 6.9%
Less:Social Transfers (ST) 6.29 - Less:Social Transfers (ST) 5.59 -
Fiscal Savings Net of ST 4.35 - Fiscal Savings Net of ST 4.25 -
   As % of  real GDP in 2005 3.6% 2.4%    As % of  real GDP in 2005 3.5% 2.3%





Gov. Revenue  46.16 11.3% Gov. Revenue  46.28 11.6%
Gov. Expenditure  36.74 -8.4% Gov. Expenditure  37.78 -5.8%
Fiscal Savings 9.42 587.0% Fiscal Savings 8.50 519.6%
   As % of  real GDP in 2005 7.7% 6.5%    As % of  real GDP in 2005 6.9% 5.8%
Less:Social Transfers (ST) 7.94 - Less:Social Transfers (ST) 7.04 -
Fiscal Savings Net of ST 1.48 - Fiscal Savings Net of ST 1.45 -
   As % of  real GDP in 2005 1.2% 0.0%    As % of  real GDP in 2005 1.2% 0.0%





Gov. Revenue  40.93 -1.3% Gov. Revenue  41.10 -0.9%
Gov. Expenditure  35.16 -12.4% Gov. Expenditure  36.64 -8.6%
Fiscal Savings 5.78 321.3% Fiscal Savings 4.45 224.9%
   As % of  real GDP in 2005 4.90% 3.74%    As % of  real GDP in 2005 3.78% 2.62%
Less:Social Transfers (ST) 14.54 - Less:Social Transfers (ST) 12.71 -
Fiscal Savings Net of ST -8.76 - Fiscal Savings Net of ST -8.25 -
   As % of  real GDP in 2005 -7.16% -8.32%    As % of  real GDP in 2005 -6.74% -7.91%
Real Public Sector Wages -42.0% Real Public Sector Wages -17.4%
Notes:
1. Welfare estimates exclude private sector cost of higher nominal wages.
5. Real GDP in 2005 is forecasted at DF 122.4 billion (using 2004 as the base year).
Source: Author's calculation based on WEO 2004
100% pass through
Predicted Real Levels '05 (DF bil)
100% pass through
Predicted Real Levels '05 (DF bil) Predicted Real Levels '05 (DF bil)
Predicted Real Levels '05 (DF bil) Predicted Real Levels '05 (DF bil)
2. The percentage change column for the share of real fiscal savings to GDP refers to percentage point difference 
between 2004 and the estimate share in 2005.
3. Social Transfers is equivalent to the estimated real income loss to households that will fall below the absolute 
poverty line (1996 base) after the devaluation.
4. Wage indexation is only applicable to households where the ratio of public sector income to total income  exceeds 
90%.
60% pass through 60% pass through
70% pass through 70% pass through
Predicted Real Levels '05 (DF bil) Predicted Real Levels '05 (DF bil)
Predicted Real Levels '05 (DF bil)
0% Wage Indexation 30% Wage Indexation
50% pass through 50% pass through
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Gov. Revenue  55.09 32.8% Gov. Revenue  55.22 33.1%
Gov. Expenditure  36.25 -9.6% Gov. Expenditure  37.49 -6.5%
Fiscal Savings 18.84 1273.7% Fiscal Savings 17.73 1193.4%
   As % of  real GDP in 2005 15.39% 14.22%    As % of  real GDP in 2005 14.49% 13.32%
Less:Social Transfers (ST) 10.57 - Less:Social Transfers (ST) 9.33 -
Fiscal Savings Net of ST 8.26 - Fiscal Savings Net of ST 8.41 -
   As % of  real GDP in 2005 6.75% 5.58%    As % of  real GDP in 2005 6.9% 5.71%





Gov. Revenue  52.18 25.8% Gov. Revenue  52.35 26.2%
Gov. Expenditure  35.37 -11.8% Gov. Expenditure  36.86 -8.1%
Fiscal Savings 16.81 1126.0% Fiscal Savings 15.49 1029.7%
   As % of  real GDP in 2005 13.73% 12.57%    As % of  real GDP in 2005 12.65% 11.49%
Less:Social Transfers (ST) 14.54 - Less:Social Transfers (ST) 12.71 -
Fiscal Savings Net of ST 2.27 - Fiscal Savings Net of ST 2.78 -
   As % of  real GDP in 2005 1.9% 0.69%    As % of  real GDP in 2005 2.3% 1.11%





Gov. Revenue  49.28 18.8% Gov. Revenue  49.47 19.3%
Gov. Expenditure  34.49 -14.0% Gov. Expenditure  36.23 -9.7%
Fiscal Savings 14.79 978.4% Fiscal Savings 13.24 866.0%
   As % of  real GDP in 2005 12.08% 10.92%    As % of  real GDP in 2005 10.82% 9.66%
Less:Social Transfers (ST) 19.02 - Less:Social Transfers (ST) 16.55 -
Fiscal Savings Net of ST -4.23 - Fiscal Savings Net of ST -3.30 -
   As % of  real GDP in 2005 -3.5% -4.62%    As % of  real GDP in 2005 -2.7% -3.86%





Gov. Revenue  40.57 -2.2% Gov. Revenue  40.84 -1.5%
Gov. Expenditure  31.85 -20.6% Gov. Expenditure  34.33 -14.4%
Fiscal Savings 8.71 535.4% Fiscal Savings 6.51 374.8%
   As % of  real GDP in 2005 7.12% 5.95%    As % of  real GDP in 2005 5.32% 4.15%
Less:Social Transfers (ST) 33.73 - Less:Social Transfers (ST) 29.75 -
Fiscal Savings Net of ST -25.02 - Fiscal Savings Net of ST -23.24 -
   As % of  real GDP in 2005 -20.44% -21.60%    As % of  real GDP in 2005 -18.98% -20.15%
Real Public Sector Wages -70.0% Real Public Sector Wages -49.0%
Notes:
1. Welfare estimates exclude private sector cost of higher nominal wages.
5. Real GDP in 2005 is forecasted at DF 122.4 billion (using 2004 as the base year).
Source: Author's calculation based on WEO 2004
100% pass through 100% pass through
Predicted Real Levels '05 (DF bil) Predicted Real Levels '05 (DF bil)
0% Wage Indexation 30% Wage Indexation
4. Wage indexation is only applicable to households where the ratio of public sector income to total income  exceeds 
90%.
3. Social Transfers is equivalent to the estimated real income loss to households that will fall below the absolute 
poverty line (1996 base) after the devaluation.
2. The percentage change column for the share of real fiscal savings to GDP refers to percentage point difference 
between 2004 and the estimate share in 2005.
Predicted Real Levels '05 (DF bil) Predicted Real Levels '05 (DF bil)
Predicted Real Levels '05 (DF bil) Predicted Real Levels '05 (DF bil)
Predicted Real Levels '05 (DF bil)
70% pass through 70% pass through
Predicted Real Levels '05 (DF bil)
50% pass through 50% pass through
60% pass through 60% pass through
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Gov. Revenue  45.58 9.9% Gov. Revenue  49.71 19.8%
Gov. Expenditure  39.09 -2.5% Gov. Expenditure  38.37 -4.4%
Fiscal Savings 6.49 373.3% Fiscal Savings 11.34 727.1%
   As % of  real GDP in 2005 5.30% 4.14%    As % of  real GDP in 2005 9.27% 8.10%
Less:Social Transfers (ST) 1.89 - Less:Social Transfers (ST) 4.44 -
Fiscal Savings Net of ST 4.60 - Fiscal Savings Net of ST 6.90 -
   As % of  real GDP in 2005 3.75% 2.59%    As % of  real GDP in 2005 5.6% -





Gov. Revenue  44.72 7.8% Gov. Revenue  48.00 15.7%
Gov. Expenditure  38.89 -3.0% Gov. Expenditure  38.11 -5.0%
Fiscal Savings 5.83 324.9% Fiscal Savings 9.89 621.1%
   As % of  real GDP in 2005 4.76% 3.60%    As % of  real GDP in 2005 8.1% 6.9%
Less:Social Transfers (ST) 2.33 - Less:Social Transfers (ST) 5.62 -
Fiscal Savings Net of ST 3.50 - Fiscal Savings Net of ST 4.27 -
   As % of  real GDP in 2005 2.86% -    As % of  real GDP in 2005 3.5% -





Gov. Revenue  43.85 5.7% Gov. Revenue  46.29 11.6%
Gov. Expenditure  38.70 -3.5% Gov. Expenditure  37.91 -5.5%
Fiscal Savings 5.15 275.8% Fiscal Savings 8.38 511.3%
   As % of  real GDP in 2005 4.21% 3.05%    As % of  real GDP in 2005 6.8% 5.7%
Less:Social Transfers (ST) 2.81 - Less:Social Transfers (ST) 6.93 -
Fiscal Savings Net of ST 2.35 - Fiscal Savings Net of ST 1.45 -
   As % of  real GDP in 2005 1.92% -    As % of  real GDP in 2005 1.2% -





Gov. Revenue  41.27 -0.5% Gov. Revenue  41.22 -0.6%
Gov. Expenditure  38.21 -4.8% Gov. Expenditure  37.70 -6.0%
Fiscal Savings 3.06 123.5% Fiscal Savings 3.52 156.5%
   As % of  real GDP in 2005 2.50% 1.34%    As % of  real GDP in 2005 2.98% 1.82%
Less:Social Transfers (ST) 4.44 - Less:Social Transfers (ST) 11.84 -
Fiscal Savings Net of ST -1.37 - Fiscal Savings Net of ST -8.32 -
   As % of  real GDP in 2005 -1.12% -    As % of  real GDP in 2005 -6.80% -
Wage Indexation 23.1% Wage Indexation 51.3%
Notes:
5. Real GDP in 2005 is forecasted at DF 122.4 billion (using 2004 as the base year).
Source: Author's calculation based on WEO 2004
4. Wage indexation is only applicable to households where the ratio of public sector income to total income  
exceeds 90%.
Predicted Real Levels '05 (DF bil)
1. Welfare estimates exclude private sector cost of higher nominal wages.
2. The percentage change column for the share of real fiscal savings to GDP refers to percentage point difference 
between 2004 and the estimate share in 2005.
3. Social Transfers is equivalent to the estimated real income loss to households that will fall below the absolute 
poverty line (1996 base) after the devaluation.
Predicted Real Levels '05 (DF bil)
70% pass through




Predicted Real Levels '05 (DF bil)
60% pass through
100% pass through
Predicted Real Levels '05 (DF bil)
30% Nominal Dev
50% pass through
Predicted Real Levels '05 (DF bil)
60% pass through
Predicted Real Levels '05 (DF bil)
70% pass through
Predicted Real Levels '05 (DF bil)
 